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ABSTRACT. If we receive information from multiple independent and
partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justiﬁed to be-
lieve these information items is aﬀected by how reliable the sources are, by
how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how
internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question.
Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case
that the more coherent the new information is, the more justiﬁed we are in
believing the new information, ceteris paribus? We show that if we consider
sets of information items of any size (Holism), and if we assume that there
exists a coherence Ordering over such sets and that coherence is a function
of the probability distribution over the propositions in such sets
(Probabilism), then Separability fails to hold.
1. INTRODUCTION
You hear someone mention at a party that there are large
colonies of wild boar roaming the southern tip of Greenland.
You read in the newspaper that the Japanese stock market
will drop and that the unemployment rate in the US will rise.
Should you believe this information? It depends. Spelling out
the factors that it depends on and in what ways it depends on
these factors is the challenge for a theory of justiﬁed belief.
We should assess how coherent the new information is. Does
it mesh well with what we believe about wild boars, climate
conditions in Greenland, economic matters,...? Is there a con-
nection between the Japanese stock market and the US
unemployment rate? We should also ask ourselves how reli-
able the information source is given our background beliefs.
What expertise does our information source have about the
fauna of Greenland and of economic matters?
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Justiﬁcation is not an all or nothing matter, but rather a
matter of degree: If the sources are independent, then the
more coherent the information is and the more reliable the
informers are, the more justiﬁed we are to accept the new
information. This is clearly a truism, but put in this format
the thesis raises an interesting question that has not received
any attention amongst epistemologists, viz. are coherence and
reliability separable factors in their impact on justiﬁed belief?
Let us explain. Suppose that medical doctors routinely pre-
scribe X-ine and Y-ine to improve some function or other.
We are curious to know why X-ine and Y-ine are good for
performance enhancement. The ﬁrst thing we might wish to
ﬁnd out is whether the eﬀectiveness of X-ine and Y-ine are
separable. Is X-ine a good thing for performance enhance-
ment, ceteris paribus? The ceteris paribus clause requires that
we keep the dosage of Y-ine ﬁxed. Is Y-ine a good thing for
performance enhancement, ceteris paribus? The ceteris paribus
clause requires that we keep the dosage of X-ine ﬁxed. If the
answer is twice yes then we have gained some headway on
the route to understanding how the treatment works. There
may still be some interaction eﬀects between X-ine and Y-ine,
but at least we can say that the treatment works is at least
partly because X-ine is eﬀective and because Y-ine is eﬀective.
The impact of X-ine and Y-ine are separable. But things are
more interesting when X-ine is not eﬀective, or is even coun-
ter eﬀective, for certain dosages of Y-ine, or vice versa:
then we cannot say that X-ine, respectively Y-ine, are eﬀec-
tive by themselves. There are curious interaction eﬀects
between X-ine and Y-ine that need to be studied to under-
stand the workings of X-ine and Y-ine.
Returning from our excursion into medicine, the question
that will concern us is whether coherence and reliability are
separable factors. We will take up one direction1 of this ques-
tion here, viz.
(i) Separability. The more coherent the new information
is, the more justiﬁed we are in believing the new infor-
mation, ceteris paribus.
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Following John Bender (1989, pp. 2–3), we distinguish
between coherence as a relation between a single new item of
information and my background beliefs as opposed to as a
property of a set of new information items. The former repre-
sents an atomistic conception of coherence. For every partic-
ular new item of information, we ask how well it meshes with
our background beliefs. The latter represents a holistic con-
ception of coherence. For a set of new items of information,
we ask how coherent this set is internally, i.e. how well the
items mesh with each other.
2. THE ATOMISTIC CONCEPTION OF COHERENCE
The better a new item of information ﬁts in with our back-
ground beliefs, the more coherent it is on the atomistic con-
ception of coherence. We deﬁne a probabilistic measure of
how coherent the information is
ð1Þ cðfIgÞ ¼ ProbðIjKÞ;
where I is the newly acquired item of information, {I} is the
information set, and K are our background beliefs. Let ¤ be
the relation of ‘... being equally or more coherent than...’.
An information set {I}¤ {I¢} iff c({I}) ‡ c({I¢}). We let
P(.) = Prob(.|K) for simplicity of representation.
There are many theoretical commitments packed into this
appeal to a measure of coherence, viz.
(ii) Atomism. The relation ¤ is deﬁned over information
singletons,
(iii) Ordering. ¤ is an ordering, i.e. the relation ¤ is tran-
sitive and complete,
and
(iv) Probabilism. A coherence measure over information
sets is a function of the probability distribution over the
propositional variables whose positive values are the
constituents of the information set.
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In the case of a singleton set, I is the propositional variable,
whose positive value is I and whose negative value is I.
The process through which the information was obtained
may be more or less reliable. Think of an information gather-
ing process as a medical test. The reliability of a medical test
can be assessed by means of the following two conditional
probabilities: P(R|I), i.e. the conditional probability that the
test will be positive (R), given that you have the disease (I),
and P(R|I), i.e. the conditional probability that the test will
be positive given that you do not have the disease. A fully
reliable test says of what is that it is and of what is not that
it is not: P(R|I) = 1 and P(R|I) = 0. An entirely worthless
test is a test that is no better than consulting some random
device: the chance of getting a positive report is the same
whether you have the disease or not, i.e. P(R|I)=P(R|I).
We are interested in partially reliable tests, i.e. tests for which
P(R|I)>P(R|I) > 0. Such tests can be located on the con-
tinuum between both fully reliable tests and entirely worthless
tests. Hence, for partially reliable tests, the likelihood ratio2
ð2Þ x ¼ PðRj:IÞ
PðRjIÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ:
We assign a degree of reliability
ð3Þ rðfIgÞ :¼ 1 x
to the information that you have the disease as provided by
the test. Similarly, let us suppose that our background infor-
mation permits us to assign a degree of reliability r({I}) to
the information as provided by a partially reliable source.3
It follows from Bayes Theorem that our degree of conﬁ-
dence in the newly acquired information is
ð4Þ PðIÞ ¼ PðIjRÞ ¼ 1ð1 rðfIgÞ=cðfIgÞ þ rðfIgÞ :
Our deﬁnition of a coherence measure satisﬁes Atomism, Prob-
abilism, and Ordering. It is easy to see that Separability holds.
From (4), it is clear that whatever the value of r({I}), raising
LUC BOVENS AND STEPHAN HARTMANN80
the value of c({I}) lowers the value of the denominator and
hence raises our degree of conﬁdence that I. We conclude that
Theorem 1. Separability, Atomism, Ordering and Probabilism
are consistent.
3. THE HOLISTIC CONCEPTION OF COHERENCE
Suppose that I receive multiple information items from differ-
ent sources. Some information sets hang together better, ﬁt
together better, mesh better than others,... This permits us to
state the following commitment:
(v) Holism. The relation ¤ is deﬁned over non-empty
information sets.
We have deﬁned Holism and Atomism so that Atomism
entails Holism, but not vice versa. Nothing hinges on this.
We could also have deﬁned both theses so that they are
mutually exclusive. The atomistic relation ¤ would then be
deﬁned over singletons and the holistic relation ¤ over n-tu-
ples for n ‡ 2. We will now show that Separability, Holism,
Ordering and Probabilism are an inconsistent quadruple.
To say that an information set contains multiple items of
information is to say that we have received the information
from multiple sources. Furthermore, these multiple sources
should not act in unison, since then the situation is indistin-
guishable from having received the information from a single
source. To determine the degree of conﬁdence that the infor-
mation is true we stipulate in our model that the information
gathering processes are independent.
In Hume’s Abject Failure, John Earman (2000, pp. 56–9)
develops a model to determine the probability that at least
one witness report of a miracle is true when the reports come
from independent witnesses. We develop a parallel model, but
are interested not in the posterior probability that the dis-
junction of the witness reports is true, but rather in the pos-
terior probability that the conjunction of the witness reports
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is true (see also Bovens and Olsson, 2000, p. 690 and pp.
696–70 and 2002, pp. 143–4).
Suppose that there are n independent and partially reliable
sources and each source i informs us of a proposition Ii, for
i = 1,..., n, so that the information set is {I1,..., In}. Let us
name Ii a fact variable and Ri a report variable. Ri can take on
two values, viz. Ri, i.e. after consultation with the proper
source, there is a report to the eﬀect that Ii is the case, and (Ri
i.e. after consultation with the proper source, there is no report
to the eﬀect that Ii is the case. We construct a joint probability
distribution P over I1,..., In, R1,..., Rn satisfying the constraint
that the sources are independent and partially reliable.
We model the independence of the sources by stipulating
that P respects the following conditional independences:
ð5Þ Ri??I1;R1; . . . ; Ii1; Ri1; Iiþ1;Riþ1; . . . ; In;RnjIi
for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n
or, in words, Ri is probabilistically independent of I1, R1,...,
Ii-1, Ri-1, Ii+1, Ri+1,..., In, Rn, given Ii, for i = 1,..., n. There
are two aspects to this characterization of independent wit-
nesses, viz. Ii screens oﬀ Ri from all other fact variables Ij and
from all other report variables Rj. The reports of independent
witnesses are determined by whether the facts they report on
hold or not. They may not always assess things correctly, but
they are not inﬂuenced in their reports by whether other facts
hold, or by whether there are reports to the eﬀect that other
reports hold. We also assume that all witnesses are equally
reliable, i.e. r({Ii}) = r for all witnesses i = 1,..., n.
It can be shown4 that, given the constraints on P,
ð6Þ PðI1; . . . ; InÞ ¼ PðI1; . . . ; InjR1; . . . ;RnÞ ¼ a0Pn
i¼0aið1 rÞi
;
where ai is the probability that exactly i propositions are false.
Note that
Pn
i¼0ai ¼ 1. For example, for an information triple
containing the propositions I1, I2, and I3, a2 = P(I1, I2, I3)
+ P(I1, I2, I3) + P(I1, I2, I3). The vector <a0 ,..., an>
is the weight vector of the probability distribution P deﬁned
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over the propositional variables I1,..., In. Throughout this
paper we assume that a0 „ 0.
The obvious question is: What is a proper measure of
coherence c({I1,..., In})? Luckily, we do not need to answer
this question to show that Separability fails, if Holism, Order-
ing, and Probabilism hold. By Probabilism, c({I1,..., In}) must
be a function of the probability distribution. Now let us take
a probability distribution P over an information pair {I1, I2}
and a probability distribution P¢ over an information pair
{I1¢, I2¢}. We construct the weight vectors <a0, a1, a2> and
<a0¢, a1¢, a2¢>. Let <a0, a1, a2> = <0.20, 0.70, 0.10> and
<a0¢, a1¢, a2¢> = <0.10, 0.10, 0.80>. We calculate our
degrees of conﬁdence in the new information by means of the
expression in (6) when r is 0.90:
ð7Þ P0ðI10; I20Þ  0:85 > 0:74  PðI1; I2Þ
and when r = 0.50:
ð8Þ P0ðI10; I20Þ  0:29<0:35  PðI1; I2Þ
By Ordering, either {I1, I2} is more or equally coherent than
{I1¢, I2¢}, or vice versa. Suppose the former is true. Then Sep-
arability fails, i.e. it is false that the more coherent the new
information is, the more justiﬁed we are to believe that the
new information is true, ceteris paribus, since for r = 0.90,
this fails to hold. Suppose the latter is true. Then Separability
fails as well, since for r=0.50 it fails to hold. Hence, without
even having deﬁned a probabilistic measure of coherence for
information pairs, we can conclude that Separability fails.
We anticipate the following rejoinder. There are other fea-
tures of the probability distribution than coherence that also
determine our degree of conﬁdence that the new information
is true. One might suggest that it is not only the coherence of
the new information, but also how expected the new informa-
tion is given our background knowledge.5 The obvious mea-
sure of expectancy is a0, i.e. the prior joint probability of the
new information. This measure indicates how expected the
new information is in its totality relative to our background
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knowledge. So the rejoinder goes as follows. In assessing
whether coherence is separable, the ceteris paribus clause
should cover not only the reliability of the witnesses but also
the expectancy of the information set.
This defense could indeed be made successful if we restrict
our attention to information pairs. To see this, let Dualism,
like Atomism, be a special case of Holism:
(v) Dualism. The relation¤ is deﬁned over information pairs.
For all existing measures of coherence, the following claim
holds true. If two information pairs have the same expectancy,
then the coherence of the information pair is a negative func-
tion of a1. Given this rather innocent assumption, we show that
Theorem 2. Separability, Dualism, Ordering and Probabilism
are consistent.
To respect Dualism, we compare two information pairs
{I1, I2} and {I1¢, I2¢}. {I1, I2} has the corresponding weight
vector <a0, a1, a2> and {I1¢, I2¢} has the corresponding
weight vector <a0¢, a1¢, a2¢>. By Probabilism, a coherence
measure is a function of the probability distribution over the
propositional variables whose positive values are the proposi-
tions in the information set. Certainly, we can deﬁne a coher-
ence measure that respects Ordering. It is easy to show that
for all existing coherence measures that respect Dualism,
Probabilism, and Ordering, the information pair S is more or
equally coherent than an information pair S¢ with equal
expectancy if and only if a1¢ ‡ a1. It follows from (6) that
ð9Þ PðI1; I2Þ ¼ a0
a0 þ ð1 a0Þx2 þ a1ðx x2Þ
Separability holds if we let the ceteris paribus clause cover
both the reliability and the expectancy. If we keep the reli-
ability of the witnesses and the expectancy of the information
set ﬁxed, i.e. we keep r (and hence x) ﬁxed and let a0=a0¢,
then more coherent information pairs, i.e. information pairs
with a lower value of a1 in their weight vectors, warrant high-
er degrees of conﬁdence.
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However, let us return to the general case, substituting
Holism for Dualism again. Even if we assume that the ceteris
paribus clause covers both the reliability and the expectancy,
Separability still fails for larger information sets. Let us take
a probability distribution P over an information triple {I1, I2,
I3} and a probability distribution P¢ over an information tri-
ple {I1¢, I2¢, I3¢} with the associated weight vectors <a0,...,
a3> and <a0¢,..., a3¢>. Let <a0,..., a3> = <0.05, 0.30,
0.10, 0.55> and <a0¢,..., a2¢> = <0.05, 0.20, 0.70, 0.05>.
Now let us calculate our degrees of conﬁdence in the new
information by means of the expression in (6) when r is 0.90:
ð10Þ P0ðI10; I20; I30Þ  0:65 > 0:61  PðI1; I2; I3Þ
and when r is 0.50:
ð11Þ P0ðI10; I20; I30Þ  0:15<0:17  PðI1; I2; I3Þ
Notice that the expectancy of the information, as measured by
a0, is ﬁxed between both information sets. Whatever coherence
ordering we impose on these information triples, Separability
fails. It is false that the more coherent the information set, the
greater our degree of conﬁdence that the information is true,
ceteris paribus, even if we let the ceteris paribus clause cover the
reliability and the expectancy of the new information. If we as-
sume that {I1, I2, I3} is more coherent than {I1¢, I2¢, I3¢}, then
Separability fails when we set r =0.90. If we assume that {I1¢,
I2¢, I3¢} is more coherent than {I1, I2, I3}, then Separability fails
when we set r =0.50. Hence, either way, Separability fails.6
Hence, we have shown that
Theorem 3. Separability, Holism, Ordering and Probabilism
are inconsistent.
This theorem holds even if we let the ceteris paribus clause
in Separability cover both reliability and expectancy.
We provide the following generalization of this counter
example for n > 3. It follows from (6) that
ð12Þ PðI1; . . . ; InÞ ¼ a0
a0 þ ð1 a0Þxn þ
Pn1
i¼1 aiðxi  xnÞ
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Take an information n-tuple {I1,..., In} with weight vec-
tor <a0, a1,..., an>. We show that there is an information
n-tuple {I1¢,..., In¢} with weight vector <a0, a1¢,..., an¢> so
that Separability, Holism, Probabilism and Ordering are
inconsistent. Note that P*(I1 ,..., In) = P*(I1¢,..., In¢) if and
only if
ð13Þ D :¼
Xn1
i¼1
ðai0  aiÞðxi  xnÞ ¼ 0
For some k such that 2 £ k £ n)2 and ak 6¼ 0, let
ð14Þ
ak10 ¼ ak1 þ d
ak
0 ¼ ak  3d
akþ10 ¼ akþ1 þ 2d
with 0 < d< ak /3 and let aj¢ = aj for all other components.
We can then calculate that
ð15Þ D ¼ dxk1ðx 1=2Þðx 1Þ:
Hence, P*(I1,..., In) = P*(I1¢,..., In¢) for (and only for) x = 0,
½, and 1, and so for (and only for) r = 0, ½, and 1. Further-
more, since P* is a continuous function of r, P*(I1,..., In) <
P*(I1¢,..., In¢) for r 2 (0, ½) and P*(I1 ,..., In) > P*(I1¢ ,..., In¢)
for r 2 (½, 1). This algorithm is just one way to obtain coun-
ter examples to the claim that Holism, Probabilism, Separabil-
ity, and Ordering are consistent. There are many ways of
doing so.
4. DISCUSSION
So what can be given up in the inconsistent quadruple of
Probabilism, Separability, Holism and Ordering? We will
argue that giving up any of these principles is at least prima
facie unappealing. The set up of our argument mirrors
Arrow’s impossibility result for social welfare rankings
(Arrow, 1963). Our result has a similar paradoxical ﬂavour.
Just as there cannot be a social welfare ranking that satisﬁes
four minimally reasonable conditions, there cannot be a
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coherence ranking that satisﬁes four seemingly plausible prin-
ciples.
4.1. Probabilism
The motivation for probabilism is the following aspiration. If
we have justiﬁed background beliefs concerning the reliability
of our sources and the chances that certain propositions
might or might not be true, then the formal calculus of prob-
ability theory can be invoked to determine whether we are
justiﬁed to believe the information that we have received
from independent witnesses. One of the determinants of whe-
ther we are justiﬁed to believe new information seems to be
the coherence of the new information. Hence the natural
question to ask is how we can give a probabilistic interpreta-
tion of the notion of coherence. There is an early attempt to
provide such an interpretation in C.I. Lewis (1946, p. 338)
and two recent attempts can be found in Shogenji (1999) and
Fitelson (2003). Our own theory is presented in Bovens and
Hartmann (2003b). Anti-Bayesian epistemologists may take
our result to be evidence that what Bayesians are after is pie
in the sky, but we would certainly like to see how much of
the project can be salvaged.
4.2. Holism
No contradiction occurs as long as we conceive of coherence
in an atomistic fashion. One might suggest that our result en-
joins us to think about whether we are justiﬁed to believe
new items of information in a piecemeal fashion. For every
new item of information, we should ask how well it coheres
with our background beliefs taken by itself and how reliable
the informers are, and decide on the basis hereof whether to
believe the new information item. But this is to give up on an
important intuition that C.I. Lewis (1946, p. 346) and Bon-
jour (1985, p. 148) capitalize on. We are often presented with
information items such that we would not be willing to be-
lieve the new items of information if considered one by one,
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but as a whole we are willing to believe them due to their
internal coherence.
4.3. Separability
There are some notorious cases of non-separability in the
philosophical literature. For instance, Kant argued in the
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1990, p. 9) that,
although it is better to have both a good will and, say,
smarts, it is actually worse to be smart when the good will is
absent (Oddie, 2001a and 2001b). But in cases where separa-
bility fails, the explanatory demand is higher. It is not suﬃ-
cient to say that the good will and smarts are conducive to
value in agency. The good will has a special status for Kant
as a virtuous trait and is radically diﬀerent from other virtu-
ous traits such as smarts. We know that highly coherent and
highly expected information from highly reliable sources in-
duces a high degree of conﬁdence that the information is
true. In the absence of a special explanation, there is a pre-
sumption that the more coherent the information is, the more
conﬁdent we may be that the information is true, ceteris pari-
bus. A special explanation can defeat this presumption, but
we cannot see how a special explanation would go in this
case. One might question what should be subsumed under the
ceteris paribus clause. It is certainly a reasonable move to in-
clude the expectancy of the new information. But we have
shown that this move does not bring us an inch further once
we move from information pairs to information triples. One
could of course try to continue this line of defense by arguing
that the determinants of our degree of conﬁdence are the reli-
ability of the new sources, the expectancy of the new infor-
mation, the coherence of the new information, and some other
probabilistic feature. This strategy might work, but in the ab-
sence of a concrete proposal, there is little to argue against.
Alternatively, one can parse the coherence of an information
set into multiple separable components. This is the escape
route from the impossibility result that we explore in Bovens
and Hartmann (2005).
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4.4. Ordering
We believe that this is indeed the weakest link in the quadru-
ple. Suppose that we are confronted with two information sets.
Is it always meaningful to make a judgment to the effect that
one information set is more coherent than the other? Of course
there are cases in which we just lack the probabilistic informa-
tion. But let us restrict ourselves here to cases where the com-
plete probabilistic information is present. For instance,
suppose that the information sets contain medical data and
that the probabilistic relations between symptoms and diseases
are well known. Sometimes, comparative judgment of coher-
ence between two information sets are uncontroversial. For in-
stance, suppose that one information set ascribes symptoms to
a patient that all point in the direction of a single disease, while
another information set ascribes symptoms that rarely coin-
cide. But sometimes, there may be complex relations of posi-
tive and negative relevance between the items of information in
the information sets and it may not make much sense to say
that one information set is more coherent than the other. Once
we give up on Ordering there is no reason to believe that we
can construct the kinds of counter examples that we have pre-
sented earlier. It might well be the case that we have picked
information sets and their associated vectors so that it would
make no sense to impose an ordering over such pairs. We ex-
plore this particular escape route from the impossibility result
in Bovens and Hartmann (2003a and 2003b, pp. 28–55).
NOTES
1 We will not take up the other direction of this question, viz. is it true
that the more reliable the sources are, the more justiﬁed we are in believ-
ing the new information ceteris paribus, here. Following Bovens and Hart-
mann (2003a, pp. 28–88), it can be shown that two information sets are
equally coherent if and only if they are characterized by the same weight
vector (2003a, p. 17), which is introduced below. From equation (2.3)
(2003a, p. 31), we can then read oﬀ that the posterior joint probability of
the propositions contained in equally coherent information sets is greater
when the information is provided by more reliable sources.
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2 One needs to be careful when talking about the likelihood ratio in
Bayesian conﬁrmation theory. Sometimes the likelihood ratio is deﬁned as
in (2) (e.g. in Howson and Urbach 1993, p. 29), sometimes as the recipro-
cal of the formula in (5) (e.g. in Pearl 1988, p. 34).
3 Our model of a partially reliable source matches interpretation (ii) of
‘dubious information-gathering processes’ in Bovens and Olsson (2000, p.
698).
4 The proof is straightforward: Apply Bayes Theorem to the right-hand
side of (7); simplify on grounds of the conditional independences in (6),
divide the numerator and denominator by P(Ri|Ii)
n and substitute in the
measure r and the parameters ai for i=1,..., n, as deﬁned underneath.
5 Another way to conceive of this is that the expectancy of the informa-
tion items is the coherence of the conjunction of the new information items
on the atomistic conception of coherence. a0 is a measure of how well the
information, taken as a whole, ﬁts in with our background beliefs. (Cf.
Bovens and Hartmann (2005)).
6 The reader who is familiar with the literature on separability may wish
to know whether it is weak or strong separability that is in question. (See
Broome, 1991, pp. 60–89.) As long as we consider only two determinants of
our degree of conﬁdence, viz. reliability and coherence, weak separability
and strong separability are coextensive. When we are considering three
determinants of our degrees of conﬁdence, viz. reliability, coherence and
expectancy, weak separability and strong separability are no longer coex-
tensive. We have shown that weak separability fails. Since strong separabil-
ity entails weak separability, strong separability fails as well. In Bovens and
Hartmann (2005) we argue that weak but not strong separability holds for
the components of a coherence vector.
7 Our research was supported by the Alexander von Humbodt Founda-
tion, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Program
for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government
through a Sofja Kovalevskaja Award.
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